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This book propounds an immensely important idea. Science makes metaphysical
presuppositions. I must, however, at once declare an interest. For well over thirty years I
have myself been expounding and arguing for just this idea.
Craig Dilworth argues that science is made up of three ingredients: metaphysical
principles, theories, and empirical laws. There are three metaphysical principles: the
principle of uniformity of nature, the principle of substance, and the principle of
causality. Dilworth takes the first to assert that “similar states of nature are followed by
similar states (p. 53), wherever and whenever they occur. The principle implies that
space and time are homogeneous. The second principle asserts that substance is material
and eternal, and “change is but an alteration of substance” (p. 55). Substance is to be
interpreted in an open-ended way, so that it might be matter, field or energy. The third
principle asserts that “change is caused” (p. 57). Putting the three principles together “we
obtain the idea that causality acts regularly through the action of one portion of substance
upon another, and that change consists in the relocation of substance” (p. 59).
These metaphysical principles are presuppositions of modern science but are not a
priori in the sense that they are known with certainty. They are open to criticism, take on
different forms for different scientific disciplines, and may be refined within a science.
Thus, as far as physics is concerned, the principle of uniformity is refined to become
invariance principles concerning spatial location, orientation and uniform motion, and
time of occurrence; the principle of substance is refined to become the principle of
conservation of energy; and the principle of causation is refined to become principles of
dynamics, “the most fundamental of which is the principle of inertia: that a body will
continue in its state of rest or uniform motion in a straight line unless acted upon by a
force” (p. 64).
According to Dilworth, the three metaphysical principles constitute “the core of
modern science” (p. 60). They influence science in at least four ways. They determine
what is ontologically necessary or possible within a science. They provide the structure
of scientific rationality. They guide research and provide methodological rules. And
they define the basic concepts of science. This influence is exercised over both empirical
and theoretical aspects of science. The task of theories is to explain empirical laws by
revealing in detail how they exemplify the three principles.
Dilworth asserts “The novelty in the present view consists in the way the principles
and their relation to the rest of science is conceived” (p. 71). This is false. Putting aside
differences of vocabulary, emphasis and details, the view expounded by Dilworth is the
same as a part of a view that I have myself defended some years earlier: see Maxwell
(1974; 1976; 1984). It is odd that Dilworth does not acknowledge my earlier work. In
four footnotes, he quotes approvingly from my (1984), three of these quotations actuallyencapsulating aspects of the view of science in question. And yet there is not a whisper
of an acknowledgement of my earlier work anywhere in Dilworth’s book. [I should add
that my (1974) and (1976) are referred to in Maxwell (1984)].
Dilworth and I employ different terminology. Dilworth calls presuppositionism (as
we may call our common view of science) the “Principle-Theory-Law (PTL) model,
whereas I call presuppositionism “aim-oriented empiricism” (AOE). There are also
slightly more substantial differences. Whereas Dilworth puts forward three metaphysical
principles of science, I put forward one, which I call physicalism. This asserts that the
universe is physically comprehensible. More specifically, it asserts that “the world is
made up of only a very few different sorts of things (atoms, point-particles, fields or
whatever) which change and interact in only one, precise, fixed way. That which does
not change, X, precisely determines the manner in which that which changes, Y, does
change (both X and Y being properties of the basic physical entities out of which
everything is composed)” (Maxwell, 1984, p. 219). Put another way, “modern natural
science presupposes that there exists some kind of unified pattern running through all
natural phenomena, it being a basic aim of physics to articulate this pattern as a testable,
comprehensive, unified theory” (Maxwell, 1984, p. 96; see also pp. 218-31). Physicalism
as I characterize it is close, even if not identical, to Dilworth’s three principles. What is
striking, however, is that their metaphysical character, their epistemological status, and
the influence they exert over science are all but identical in the two views.
Dilworth intends his (unrefined) three principles, when variously interpreted, to be
presuppositions of all branches of modern science – not just physics, but chemistry,
geology, biology, and even social sciences such as economics. This is not very plausible.
Dilworth takes life to be the substance of biology, but life is neither eternal nor conserved
(as the principle of substance requires). Both biology and geology have an essential
historical dimension, which ill-accords with the three principles. Dilworth attempts to
show that economics presupposes his three principles (appropriately interpreted), but I
found this attempt unconvincing.
AOE is free of these defects. Physicalism is taken to be the presupposition of
physics, and therefore of all of natural science (physics being the fundamental natural
science). Other disciplines of natural science can then make more specific
presuppositions, particular to each discipline, as long as these are taken from, or are
sufficiently in accordance with, results of more basic sciences, and ultimately of physics.
Thus chemistry can assume that mass is conserved in chemical reactions because physics
tells us this is nearly enough the case. Viewing natural science as an interlinked whole in
this way frees one of the need to specify the same kind of presuppositions for all branches
of natural science. One can see geology, for example, as accepting results from physics
and chemistry but nevertheless having an aim quite different from either, in that it seeks
to acquire knowledge of the structure and history of a particular object – the Earth.
Above I said that Dilworth’s PTL model is all but identical to a part of my AOE; I
said this because AOE, in a number of ways, further develops the common basic idea of
presuppositionism. Here are nine deficiencies in Dilworth’s account, deficiencies made
good in my (1984) – and in my (1976) and (1974).
First, Dilworth fails to provide what is, in my view, the basic argument in support of
presuppositionism. This is that physics only ever accepts unified theories, even though
endlessly many disunified rivals can always be concocted that are just as, or even more,empirically successful. This persistent acceptance of unified theories only, even though
endlessly many empirically more successful disunified rivals are available, means that
physics persistently assumes that there is some kind of underlying dynamic unity in
nature – the metaphysical thesis of physicalism (Maxwell, 1984, p. 96 and pp. 206-246;
1976, p. 75-6; 1974, pp. 125-36).
Second, as a result of failing to put forward this (or any other) argument in support of
presuppositionism, Dilworth fails to explicate adequately the metaphysical
presuppositions of modern science. The above argument makes clear that the key idea is
dynamic unity in nature – the universe being such that the true physical theory of
everything is more or less unified. Dilworth’s three principles do not contain or imply
unity. Lacking the above argument, Dilworth fails to appreciate the key role played by
unity (for which see Maxwell, 1984, pp. 96-100 and 218-225; 1976, pp. 75, 107-110;
1974, pp. 129, 140-141, and 264-294).
Third, Dilworth fails to stress the profoundly problematic character of the
metaphysical presuppositions of science, and thus fails to emphasize that these
presuppositions, because they are problematic and exercise a profound influence over
science, need to be made explicit within science, so that they can be critically assessed,
alternatives being developed and assessed in the hope of improving the metaphysical
assumptions made by science. For these points see (Maxwell, 1984, pp. 96-100, 110-117
and 223-246; 1976, p. 65 and 69; 1974, pp. 249-254).
Fourth, Dilworth does not appreciate that physicists fail to make explicit and criticize
metaphysical presuppositions of physics because of their allegiance to an untenable
doctrine I call standard empiricism (SE). According to SE, the basic aim of physics is
truth, the basic method being to assess claims to knowledge with respect to empirical
success and failure (and perhaps considerations of simplicity and unity), no persistent
metaphysical assumption being made by science. SE implies that metaphysics cannot be
a part of scientific knowledge (unless implied by current knowledge). Taking SE for
granted, physicists are, as a result, debarred from performing the vital scientific task of
criticizing and improving relevant untestable, metaphysical assumptions (see Maxwell,
1984, pp. 98-100; 1976, pp. 58-61 and 63-64).
Fifth, Dilworth does not realize that it is not just the views of philosophers of science
that need to change; science itself needs to change. If science is to be pursued rigorously,
SE needs to be repudiated by the scientific community, and AOE needs to be accepted
and put into scientific practice instead. This involves at least shaping science so that
there are three levels of discussion: (1) empirical data; (2) theory; and (3) metaphysical
assumptions or aims (see Maxwell, 1984, pp. 97-100, 231-245; 1976, p. 103-110; 1974,
pp. 249-257 and 288-291).
Sixth, Dilworth fails to see that, in order to facilitate criticism and improvement of
(3), science needs to represent its assumptions or aims in the form of a hierarchy,
assumptions becoming less and less substantial, and more nearly such that their truth is
required for science, or the pursuit of knowledge, to be possible at all, as one goes up the
hierarchy. In this way, a framework of relatively unproblematic, stable assumptions and
associated methods is created, high up in the hierarchy, within which much more
substantial, specific and problematic assumptions and associated methods, low down in
the hierarchy, can be effectively criticized and improved, as science proceeds.
Assumptions low down in the hierarchy, from the history of physics, include such ideasas that everything is made up of corpuscles interacting by contact, point-atoms interacting
by means of forces at a distance, a unified, classical field, quantum particles, a unified
quantum field, quantum superstrings. According to AOE, that assumption is to be
(provisionally) accepted which (a) best accords with physicalism and (b) sustains the
most empirically progressive research programme, or holds out the best hope of such a
programme: see Maxwell (1984, pp. 232-235).
Seventh, having failed to develop this hierarchical view, Dilworth naturally fails to
see that it leads straight to a new conception of scientific rationality. For, according to
AOE, as scientific knowledge improves, so the (low-level) assumptions and associated
methods of science improve as well; the aims and methods of science improve or, as one
may put it, knowledge-about-how-to-improve-knowledge improves. There is something
like positive feedback between improving knowledge and improving knowledge-about-
how-to-improve-knowledge – a feature of scientific meta-methodology which helps
explain the explosive growth of scientific knowledge (see Maxwell, 1984, pp. 231-242).
Eighth, Dilworth does not realize that this transforms science into something rather
close to the natural philosophy of Newton’s time, in that science includes sustained
discussion of metaphysics, aims and methods, philosophy of science and epistemology
(see Maxwell, 1984, pp. 231-240; 1976, pp. 53-63, 67, 79-80, 82 and 103-110; 1974, pp.
288-291).
Ninth, Dilworth ignores that science does not just seek explanatory truth – truth
presupposed to be explanatory; more generally, it seeks important truth. Values, of one
kind of another, are inherent in science. But, for all sorts of reasons, value assumptions
are almost more problematic than metaphysical assumptions. If science is to be rational,
and if it is to serve the best interests of humanity, it is essential that conjectures about
what it is of value to discover, and what it is scientifically possible to discover, are
articulated and critically assessed, as an integral part of science, to give us our best hope
of discovering what is both of value and discoverable. Furthermore, science seeks
valuable truth so that it will be used by people, ideally in beneficial ways. This social or
humanitarian aim of science is, if anything, even more problematic. Once again, if
science is to be both rational and serve the best interests of humanity, the problematic
humanitarian or social goals of science need to be articulated and critically assessed: see
Maxwell (1984, pp. 100-117 and 152-166; 1976, pp. 52-158).
I might add that since the publication of the first edition of the book under review,
there have been further developments in AOE which Dilworth might have taken note of
for this second edition. In Maxwell (1998) in particular, I develop the hierarchical aspect
of AOE further, and show how the problem of induction, and problems concerning the
unity of physical theory can be solved within the framework of AOE.
This second edition of The Metaphysics of Science is unchanged except for three
additional chapters, one discussing the problem of demarcating science from non-science,
one responding to critics of the first edition, and one arguing forcefully that technological
innovation is leading humanity towards catastrophe. Dilworth suggests that we need a
new metaphysical paradigm for a new kind of science. He seems not to have noticed my
argument that what we really need is a revolution in academic inquiry so that the basic
aim becomes to seek and promote wisdom rather than just acquiring knowledge –
wisdom being the capacity to realize what is of value in life, thus including knowledge,
but much else besides (see Maxwell, 1984).Despite these criticisms, I would like to reiterate the point with which I began: this
book propounds an immensely important idea – even if one that received a much
improved formulation at least twelve years before publication of the first edition.
References
MAXWELL, N. (1974) The Rationality of Scientific Discovery, Parts I and II,
Philosophy of Science, 41, pp. 123-153 and 247-295.
MAXWELL, N. (1976) What’s Wrong With Science? (Hayes, Middlesex, Bran’s Head
Books).
MAXWELL, N. (1984) From Knowledge to Wisdom (Oxford, Blackwell; 2
nd ed. 2007,
London, Pentire Press).
NICHOLAS MAXWELL
13 Tavistock Terrace
London N19 4BZ
UK
Email: nicholas.maxwell@ucl.ac.uk